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Constitutional Law-ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN PRISON:
ARE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED?-State v. Calhoun,
479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic surveillance of prisoners' conversations is a law en-
forcement tool used throughout the United States. A valuable se-
curity measure, the practice has survived constitutional and statu-
tory challenges in numerous factual settings.1 However, on
rehearing State v. Calhoun,2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
recently upheld constitutional and statutory challenges to the ad-
missibility into evidence of secretly videotaped conversations be-
tween prisoners. The Fourth District incorporated the trial court's
order of suppression,3 and stated that the police had violated the
defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights by making a surrep-
titious recording of a conversation between two inmates. The deci-
sion also was based on the Florida constitutional provision barring
unreasonable interception of private communication,4 as well as a
statutory prohibition against certain interceptions and disclosures
of oral communications.6
Surprisingly, the court failed to comment on its initial, well-rea-
soned opinion, which had found the tape recording admissible.6 In
fact, the majority opinion on rehearing is the almost verbatim dis-
sent of Judge Barkett to the original opinion.7 Although the result
may be the "right" one, Judge Barkett's reasoning is unconvincing.
In this Note, the author will analyze the facts, discuss and critique
the two opinions, and suggest alternative theories that the Fourth
District might have used to reach the same result.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (conversation in jail visiting room); Brown v. State, 349 So. 2d 1196
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078 (1978) (conversation in back seat of a
police car); People v. Myles, 379 N.E.2d 897 (I1. 1978) (telephone conversation). But see In
re Kozak, 256 N.W.2d 717 (S.D. 1977) (telephone conversation between an inmate and his
attorney).
2. 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), vacating 10 Fla. L.W. 2176 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept.
27, 1985).
3. Id. at 243.
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
5. FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (1985).
6. State v. Calhoun, 10 Fla. L.W. 2176 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 27, 1985), vacated, 479 So. 2d
241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In contrast, Judge Walden cited this opinion as explanation for his
dissent. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 246 (Walden, J., dissenting).
7. Calhoun, 10 Fla. L.W. at 2178 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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II. State v. Calhoun
David Calhoun, the defendant, and his brother were being held
in jail on various charges when Calhoun became a suspect in a sep-
arate armed robbery. Detectives brought Calhoun to an interview
room in the sheriff's office which was equipped with a concealed
videotape camera and a microphone. After he was read his Mi-
randa rights, Calhoun asked to speak to his brother before talking
to the detectives.8 The detectives granted his request and left the
two brothers alone in the interview room, ostensibly for a private
conversation. The detectives then monitored that conversation. In
about five minutes, Calhoun's brother was removed from the room
and Calhoun was again read his Miranda rights. This time Cal-
houn indicated that he wanted to remain silent and asked to see
his attorney.9 In a last attempt to get information, the police again
placed Calhoun's brother in the interview room and secretly re-
corded and videotaped the conversation for "investigative pur-
poses." 10 No court order authorized the intercept. At trial, the
court granted Calhoun's motion to suppress the recorded state-
ments, admissions, and confessions. The state appealed to the
Fourth District, which initially reversed the trial court's order.
The Fourth District rejected the assertion that the videotaping
was an unreasonable search and seizure which violated the Florida
Constitution. It reasoned that a prisoner has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in jail and, thus, no constitutional privacy protec-
tion." The Florida statute against unlawful interception of an oral
communication was held not violated because, like the constitu-
tional provision, the statute applies only to persons with a reason-
able expectation of privacy.' 2 Regarding Calhoun's claim that his
fifth amendment right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Ar-
izona"3 had been violated, the court decided that because there
had been no interrogation by police officers, no Miranda violation
arose. Finally, Calhoun's assertion that his sixth amendment right
to counsel had been violated proved unsuccessful. Previous Florida
case law provides that unless the statements complained of are
made to an officer of the state or a state agent, there is no sixth
8. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 242.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 243.
11. Calhoun, 10 Fla. L.W. at 2176.
12. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1985).
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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amendment violation. 4 Because Calhoun's brother was not a state
agent and did not solicit information from Calhoun, the court held
there had been no violation of Calhoun's right to counsel.15
Three months later, however, after a rehearing, the Fourth Dis-
trict rendered a second opinion which affirmed the trial court's
suppression. While conceding that the interview room alone did
not justify a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court found
that Calhoun's specific situation was unlike that of previous de-
fendants involved in similar cases: "[T]he defendant had a clear
expectation of privacy because such an expectation was deliber-
ately fostered by the police officers. . . . [They gave] every indica-
tion that the conversation was to be secure and private."' 6
Having established the defendant's privacy expectation, the
court invoked the fourth amendment right to privacy and also
cited the Florida Constitution, which protects private conversa-
tions from being recorded. 17 Furthermore, the court stated that ab-
sent consent or a court order, a willful interception was unlawful
under section 934, Florida Statutes. The Fourth District also rec-
ognized fifth amendment grounds for suppressing the tape record-
ings, emphasizing that upon being read his Miranda rights, Cal-
houn invoked his right to silence and his right to an attorney. The
court found that when the police put Calhoun and his brother to-
gether again, they were indirectly interrogating Calhoun in viola-
tion of his expressed right to remain silent."8 Finally, without dis-
cussion, the court found that Calhoun's sixth amendment right to
counsel was violated. 19
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
The fourth amendment guarantees an individual's right to pri-
vacy by prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures."2 ° While
14. Calhoun, 10 Fla. L.W. at 2177-78 (citing Bottoson v. State, 443 So. 2d 962 (Fla.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 223 (1984)).
15. Id. at 2178.
16. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 243.
17. The court based its constitutional decision on FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12: " 'The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions by any means, shall not be violated.'" Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 243 (emphasis in
opinion).
18. Id. at 245.
19. Id. (The court cited to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), a case decided on
the basis of the fifth, not the sixth, amendment to the United States Constitution.).
20. The fourth amendment provides:
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the United States Supreme Court has held that electronic surveil-
lance of citizens is subject to fourth amendment coverage,2 protec-
tion in the prison setting has been limited. This restriction rests on
two theories: prisons are not protected areas, and prisoners do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The protected area concept was first mentioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Lanza v. New York, 2 where the police
surreptitiously recorded a visiting room conversation between
Lanza and his jailed brother. The majority found it "obvious that a
jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automo-
bile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has
traditionally been the order of the day. '23 In 1967, however, in
Katz v. United States24 the Court declared that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. . . . [W]hat [a person]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected."2 5 Although Katz repudi-
ated the protected areas analysis epitomized by Lanza, courts con-
sistently followed Lanza and upheld the admission of secretly
monitored conversations in jails or police stations.26
In 1974, however, the Supreme Court held in Wolff v. McDon-
nell2 7 that a prisoner does not surrender all of his constitutional
rights at the prison gates. "ITihough his rights may be diminished
by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when
he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country. 28 Since Wolff,
virtually every federal appellate court addressing the question has
concluded that there is some fourth amendment protection in
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962).
23. Id. at 143.
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. Id. at 351-52.
26. See generally Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the
Fourth Amendment out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1055-58 (1976).
27. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
28. Id. at 555-56.
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prison.2 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered this question in United States v. Lilly.30 Although the
decision did not deal with electronic surveillance, the court's
fourth amendment analysis is applicable to all types of searches
and seizures.
The Lilly court was concerned with the degree of fourth amend-
ment protection afforded inmates when they returned to prison af-
ter unsupervised absences.-" The defendant had attempted to
smuggle contraband into prison in a body cavity. The court found
that a prisoner could not be denied all fourth amendment protec-
tion because he could then be subjected to whatever form of search
and seizure a prison employee might care to conduct, no matter
how intrusive. It concluded that a "prisoner loses only those rights
that must be sacrificed to serve legitimate penological needs."3
Thus, even though a warrant is not required to conduct a search or
seizure in prison, the government has the burden of justifying the
reasonableness of its action given all the facts and circumstances.3
The governmental interest in administering prisons must justify
the intrusion in each case, and this governmental interest must be
more than just general law enforcement needs, such as searches
directed at solving a particular crime. Governmental interests jus-
tifying intrusion include protecting guards and inmates, controlling
contraband, and preventing escapes. 34
A recent United States Supreme Court case, however, may limit
the Lilly requirement that a legitimate penological need necessi-
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1978).
The commentators also agree on this subject. See, e.g., Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 26;
Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning
Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669
(1972); Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California Prisons after DeLancie v. Superior
Court: Civil Liberty or Civil Death?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1109 (1982).
30. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1244. This view was later followed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984).
33. Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1245. The Lilly court found this burden to be fair because the
prison administration is in a better position to prove the reasonableness of its actions than a
prisoner is to prove to the contrary. Id. It is a longstanding rule that the government bears
the burden of proving reasonableness in situations where neither a warrant nor probable
cause are necessary to conduct a search or seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Afanador, 567
F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).
34. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 26, at 1071.
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tate the search. Hudson v. Palmer 5 involved a prison inmate
whose cell was the subject of a shakedown search. The Supreme
Court held that, although prisoners enjoy many constitutional pro-
tections,3 6 "[t]he recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their
individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of
incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. '37
The Court found that the need for security would always be para-
mount to the prisoners' expectation of privacy in their cells.3 8
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's
refusal to recognize any privacy or possessory interest of the in-
mate, regardless of how remote the threat to prison security. 9 He
asserted that the majority's "perception of what society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any empirical
data."'40 Further, the majority recognized no reasonable possessory
interests of prisoners and "that the Fourth Amendment has no ap-
plication at all to a prisoner's 'papers and effects.' ",41
By failing to require that prison officials show legitimate peno-
logical objectives, the Court in Hudson would give them absolute
discretion to conduct prison searches. Does this decision mark the
end of all fourth amendment rights for prisoners? The case law has
not yet answered this question. It may be that the Hudson rule is
limited to seizures made in prisoners' cells. It is also possible that
Hudson will be applicable only in situations where a prisoner's pa-
pers or effects are seized. However, if Hudson also applies to the
interception of communications, the case may signal the death
knell for any fourth amendment arguments by prisoners.
Recent Florida cases discussing privacy interests of prisoners
have generally followed federal fourth amendment analysis. In
35. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). The prisoner in this case argued that the search of his locker
and cell by a prison official was unreasonable. The district court disagreed and granted sum-
mary judgment for the prison official. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that an inmate has a limited privacy right in his cell entitling him to
protection against searches conducted solely to harass. See Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220
(4th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
36. The Court mentioned the first amendment religious freedoms and the eighth amend-
ment protections against cruel and unusual punishment as examples of constitutional pro-
tections that apply to prisoners. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
37. Id. at 526.
38. Id. at 528.
39. Id. at 542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
40. Id. at 549.
41. Id. at 555.
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Brown v. State,42 the Fourth District applied the rule promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court in Lanza: a prisoner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy and officials may exercise con-
stant surveillance, including eavesdropping on prisoners' conversa-
tions.43 The Florida Supreme Court, in Wells v. State,44 reviewed
fourth amendment protection in the prison context in a case con-
cerning the search of a prison visitor. A prison employee had re-
ceived tips that the visitor was bringing marijuana to an inmate.
The court cited Lanza for authority that the defendant in Wells
had no reasonable expectation of privacy. In contrast, the Wells
court seemed to adopt the standard in Wolff v. McDonnell45 and
United States v. Lilly,46 that a search conducted for legitimate pe-
nological reasons is valid. The court noted that the search at issue
in Wells was conducted "for the limited purpose of discovering
whether [the defendant] was carrying contraband into the
prison. '47 Justice Sundberg cited Lilly in his concurrence and em-
phasized that the pretext of jail security should not be used as an
excuse for unlimited abuse of constitutional rights.48
Another case resolved by the standards set forth in Wolff and
Lilly is a decision from the Third District Court of Appeal dealing
with body cavity searches of inmates. In Vera v. State,49 prison
officials received information from a confidential source that the
defendant, an inmate on work detail, would bring contraband into
the prison concealed in a body cavity. The Third District upheld
the subsequent search of the prisoner. The court found that al-
though the government is not required to obtain a warrant or es-
tablish probable cause to conduct a prison search, the government
has the burden of showing the reasonableness of the search.50 Ad-
ditionally, the court noted the legitimate penological interests of
the prison officials in maintaining prison security. The court found
the need "to preserve internal order and discipline, maintain se-
42. 349 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078 (1978). See infra
notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
43. In 1984, the Fifth District agreed with the Brown court in a factually similar situa-
tion. See DiGuilio v. State, 451 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 10
Fla L.W. 430 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1985).
44. 402 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1981).
45. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
46. 576 F.2d. 1240 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
47. Wells, 402 So. 2d at 405.
48. Id. at 407-08 (Sundberg, C.J., concurring specially).
49. 400 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
50. Id. at 1010.
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curity, and rehabilitate prisoners" justified the body cavity search
based on the information related to prison officials by the reliable
confidential source.5' The court was careful to limit its holding to
the facts of the case, which were that the prison officials were
presented with reliable information as to a genuine threat to prison
security. Thus, the officials' interest in maintaining prison security
will not always, absent other factors, justify a search.
Although Wells and Vera were decided in 1981, both followed
the federal fourth amendment analysis of prison searches and
seizures enunciated in Wolff and Lilly. Furthermore, future Flor-
ida cases that deal with this issue will also be forced to follow the
federal view. The reason for this is that the Florida constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was
amended in 1982. The amendment required that the state courts'
interpretation of Florida's prohibition against unreasonable
searches conform to the United States Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment.52
Apparently, the Fourth District in Calhoun was unaware of the
1982 amendment. The court cited the Florida Constitution as giv-
ing more protection than the United States Constitution to private
communications.5 3 It distinguished prior Florida cases as being de-
cided on federal constitutional grounds." Judge Barkett, writing
for the majority, stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy
was deliberately fostered by the police officers when they complied
with Calhoun's request to see his brother and then exited the
room, leaving the brothers alone.55 Judge Barkett placed great em-
phasis on the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy. This
interpretation of privacy rights in jail is unprecedented in Flor-
51. Id.
52. The Florida Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against . . .unreasonable interception of private communications by any means,
shall not be violated.. . . This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. See also State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983) (discussing
retroactivity of amendment which mandates conformity of Florida's search and seizure re-
quirements with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment).
53. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 244.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 243.
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ida.56 Surely, every defendant who makes incriminating statements
when left alone with another person does so because he has been
led to believe that no one else will be listening. However, the pa-
rameters of what is considered to be a reasonable expectation of
privacy are not defined by the defendant's belief alone.
The Calhoun court stated that because the conversation took
place in an interview room did not diminish its privacy.57 However,
the court seemed to ignore that although the fourth amendment
does protect "people and not places," reference to the place where
the right is being asserted is essential to the application of the ob-
jective standard for determining the reasonableness of the expecta-
tion of privacy.58 Thus, in an effort to exclude the tape recorded
conversations, the Fourth District adopted a haphazard analysis of
fourth amendment rights as applied to prisoners.
Perhaps the decision would rest on more solid ground had the
court discussed the fact that the detectives monitored the conver-
sation for investigative purposes, not for prison security reasons.
After Wells and Lilly, there is an argument that a search must be
conducted for legitimate penological purposes and not just for gen-
eral law enforcement reasons.59 The Fourth District did not discuss
this line of cases, even though it did emphasize the trial court's
finding that the tape recording was " 'for investigative purposes,
not just for security.' "60
IV. STATUTORY ISSUES
Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements for
the interception and disclosure of oral communications. The stat-
ute makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, for any person will-
fully to intercept, use, or disclose any wire or oral communica-
tion."1 An "oral communication" is defined in chapter 934 as "any
oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
56. Indeed, only one other court has found a right of privacy violation based on the fact
that the police lulled the defendant into thinking that the conversation was private. See
North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972).
57. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 244.
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
60. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 243.
61. An exception occurs where there is prior consent of all parties or a court order.
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that such communication is not subject to interception under cir-
cumstances justifying such expectation. '6 2
In State v. Inciarrano,63 the Florida Supreme Court discussed
the legislative intent behind this language. It found that the legis-
lature intended to prohibit the interception of conversations made
with a reasonable expectation of privacy. According to the court, a
reasonable expectation of privacy incorporates not only the subjec-
tive expectation of the person conversing but also an expectation
that society would recognize as reasonable under the circum-
stances.6 ' The statutory definition of "oral communication" there-
fore establishes the parameters of the statutory prohibition against
interception of oral communications. If there is no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, then recording the conversation is not pro-
scribed by the statute.6 5
The Fourth District in Calhoun did not analyze the statute this
way. It concluded that because there was no court order authoriz-
ing the intercept, and neither conversant had knowledge of or con-
sented to the intercept, the intercept was unreasonable.66 That in-
terpretation is dubious in light of the Florida Supreme Court's
construction of the statute. The Fourth District should also have
discussed whether society would recognize a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. If so, then section 934.03 would proscribe the
interception.
V. FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
The fifth amendment protects each person from being compelled
to incriminate himself in a criminal case. In the landmark case of
Miranda v. Arizona,68 the United States Supreme Court discussed
this privilege and created a rule requiring police to advise arrested
persons of their rights under the fifth amendment.6 9 These proce-
dural safeguards were established to alleviate the coercive atmo-
62. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
63. 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).
64. Id. at 1275.
65. See DiGuilio v. State, 451 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 10 Fla. L.W. 430 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1985).
66. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 243.
67. The fifth amendment states, in part, that "[nlo person shall... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. Id. at 479.
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sphere inherent in custodial interrogation.70 The court ordered
that, prior to any questioning, a suspect "must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 71  Any
waiver of these rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. 72 If the suspect asserts "in any manner and at any
stage of the process" his right to remain silent or requests that an
attorney be present during questioning, the interrogation must
cease.
73
In order for the fifth amendment to be invoked in the Miranda
context, there must be interrogation. In Rhode Island v. Innis,7 4
the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "interrogation"
under the Miranda rule. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated that custodial interrogation refers not only to the express
questioning of a suspect in custody but also to its "functional
equivalent. 75 The Court held the functional equivalent to be "any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."76 The Court explained that the interrogation "must re-
flect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that [which is]
inherent in custody itself."77 The test for determining this level of
compulsion focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect
without regard to objective proof of the intent of the police. 78
70. The coercive atmosphere inherent in custodial interrogation exerts pressure on a sus-
pect to utter incriminating statements and thus endangers the suspect's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 461. "An individual swept from familiar surround-
ings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques
of persuasion. . . cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak." Id. The reading of
the Miranda warnings was intended to dispel the compulsion inherent in a police-domi-
nated atmosphere. Id. at 469.
71. Id. at 444.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 444-45.
74. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
75. Id. at 300-01.
76. Id. at 301.
77. Id. at 300.
78. Id. at 301. The Court noted, however, that police intent is not irrelevant, because it
may indicate whether the police should have known their words or actions would evoke an
incriminating response. "In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an in-
criminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one
which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect." Id. at 301
n.7.
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In Calhoun there is no doubt that the defendant was in custody,
but it is not as clear whether there was any interrogation because
there was no questioning by or conversation with the police. Of
course, there is an argument that the police, by placing the two
brothers alone in the interview room, should have known that their
actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. In fact,
Judge Barkett asserted that Calhoun's brother became an agent of
the state and thus participated in "interrogation" of the defend-
ant29 Calhoun's brother, however, was not employed by the state,
and was not acting at the direction of any state agent.
In Brown v. State,"° the Fifth District Court of Appeal faced an
analogous situation. Following his arrest, Brown and another per-
son were placed in the back seat of an empty police cruiser. Their
conversation was secretly recorded. The court found no fifth
amendment violation because "[tihe incriminating statements
made in the course of this conversation were not responsive to any
process of interrogation." 81
Not every incriminating statement that is a result of police ac-
tion, either directly or indirectly, is a result of interrogation. As
stated in United States ex rel. Church v. DeRobertis:
Unless an element of potential trickery or overbearing by the
police is part of the definition of "nonverbal interrogation," al-
most anything that produces a confession would be interrogation.
Innis itself rejects such a test of but-for causation. Suppose the
police put a Bible in a suspect's cell, or permit him to attend a
religious service at his request. Or suppose they simply leave pa-
per and pencil in his cell. Are these things "interrogation"? But
for the paper and pencil, the suspect could not write out his writ-
ten confession, yet there is nothing about the action of leaving
writing implements in the cell that comes close to "compulsion"
as that word is used in the privilege against self-incrimination."2
There was nothing about the action of placing Calhoun's brother in
the interview room at Calhoun's request that would meet the level
of compulsion required for a fifth amendment violation.
79. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 245.
80. 349 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078 (1978).
81. Id. at 1197-98. See also DiGuilio v. State, 451 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 10 Fla. L.W. 430 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1985) (conversation between defend-
ant and another person in the back seat of police car "not made in response to
interrogation").
82. 771 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1985).
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VI. SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
*As discussed earlier, the Fourth District in Calhoun stated that
the defendant "had expressly invoked his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. '8 3
Later in the decision,"4 the court based the alleged sixth amend-
ment violation on Edwards v. Arizona,85 a case decided on the ba-
sis of the fifth, not the sixth, amendment. The court was clearly
confused.
The sixth amendment right to counsel is not invoked but, in-
stead, attaches automatically as soon as a suspect is formally
charged, or at the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal pro-
ceedings.88 After the sixth amendment right attaches, absent a
proper waiver,87 there may be no interrogation of a defendant
without his attorney present. In Florida, there is support for the
proposition that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at
first appearance.8 8 Additionally, there is support for the proposi-
tion that the attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel
in one case against the defendant does not mean that the police
are prohibited from questioning the defendant about other crimes
in which he is merely a suspect.89
In Calhoun, the defendant was merely a suspect in a crime for
which the police wanted to question him.90 He had not been
charged, nor had there been a first appearance in the matter. No
sixth amendment issues were implicated.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the
Fourth District's decision in Calhoun is grounded in tenuous anal-
ysis. The court seems to strive for a fair result without properly
considering all the case law. Nevertheless the facts of the case do
indicate that the detectives led Calhoun to believe that they
respected his right to silence. Then they placed Calhoun's brother
in the interrogation room, expecting that the two would continue
83. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 244 (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 245.
85. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
86. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
87. Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966).
88. State v. Douse, 448 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
89. See Lofton v. State, 471 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
90. The court stated that Calhoun "was in jail on an unrelated charge when he became a
suspect in this case." Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 242.
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their previous conversation about the armed robbery. Such trick-
ery should be condemned, and the courts should develop case law
to address this type of action.
Unfortunately, the sixth amendment and the cases construing it
were not applicable because there had been no initiation of adver-
sarial judicial proceedings. Thus, the sixth amendment right to
counsel had not attached. Similarly, unless one is willing to accept
Judge Barkett's contention that Calhoun's brother became an
agent of the state, 1 the fifth amendment would not come into
play. Although Calhoun was given his Miranda rights, and al-
though he was in custody at the time of the conversation, the in-
terrogation necessary to invoke the fifth amendment was not
present.
An analysis that might be used in the future to condemn similar
police behavior should be based on the fourth amendment. There
exists in current case law the proposition that prisoners do have
some fourth amendment rights. There are qualifications placed on
the motives that will justify searches and seizures in prisons. An
exemplary analysis is the Fifth Circuit's determination that, in or-
der for a prison search to be valid, the government must demon-
strate a legitimate penological need. Florida case law seems implic-
itly to adopt this idea. Protection of other inmates, for example,
would be a legitimate justification for search and seizure. However,
monitoring a conversation as in Calhoun, "'for investigative pur-
poses, not just for security,' "92 should not be a valid motive. The
courts in Florida should further the reasoning put forth by the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits regarding prison searches, and by do-
ing so, bring clarity to an area of fourth amendment protection
that has much potential for abuse.
Kelly M. Haynes
91. Id.
92. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 243 (emphasis in original).
